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CASES NOTED
The third district's decision has, however, since been overruled by
the Florida Supreme Court.29 In so doing, the court clarified an impor-
tant"0 area of the law which had been misinterpreted since the Frank case
was decided in 1959."' The court construed the language of the insurance
contract, and concluded that it meant what it appeared to say-that loss
to the automobile by theft was covered by the comprehensive provision,
and by implication, that the loss was indeed "direct and accidental."32
Moreover, the decision stressed that as long as insurance companies
insist on drawing their contracts in language which is difficult and con-
fusing to the ordinary purchaser, then that language will be construed
strictly against the company and liberally in favor of the policyholder.3
The stress was well placed.
MELVILLE DUNN
ANTI-LAPSE-RIGHT OF ADOPTED CHILD TO TAKE
The adopted daughter of a devisee, who had predeceased the testa-
trix, sought to recover the share to which her adopting father would have
been entitled had he survived the testatrix. The trial court rendered final
judgment for the adopted child. On appeal, held, affirmed: The adopted
child of a devisee who predeceases the testatrix is a "lineal descendant"
within the meaning of Florida's anti-lapse statute,' and is therefore en-
titled to the share her adopting parent would have received had he sur-
vived the testatrix. In re Baker's Estate, 172 So.2d 268 (Fla. 2d Dist.
1965).
Since adoption was unknown to the common law,2 there was no com-
29. Hartnett v. Southern Ins. Co., 181 So.2d 524 (Fla. 1965).
30. Virtually every standard form of automobile insurance contract contains a com-
prehensive clause. See supra note 5.
31. Frank v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 109 So.2d 594 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1959).
32. 181 So.2d at 528:
Elemental principles in construing these contracts ...requires a conclusion that
theft is included in the coverage. How there could be any doubt of this in view
of the plain language showing a premium charge ...for 'A-Comprehensive-Loss
of or damage to the automobile, except by collision or upset, but including fire,
theft and windstorm' escapes us.
It is interesting to note that the third district's decision apparently did not consider
the express inclusion of theft on the face of the insurance policy. As previously noted, how-
ever, this difference in form should not make any difference in interpreting the contract.
The standard form appears in note 1 supra, and the third district's reference to it in 171
So.2d at 440. The clause in which theft is expressly included is cited in 181 So.2d at 527.
33. Id. at 528.
1. FLA. STAT. § 731.20 (1963). For the text of this statute, see note 22 infra.
2. In re Palmer's Adoption, 129 Fla. 630, 176 So. 537 (1937); Hockaday v. Lynn, 200
Mo. 456, 98 S.W. 585 (1906); In re Howlett's Estate, 366 Pa. 293, 77 A.2d 390 (1951); see
ATKINSON, WnLS (1953); REPPY & TOMPmNS, LAW OF WI.Ls (1928); 1 AM. JUR., Adop-
tion of Children § 32 (1936).
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mon law right of inheritance in an adopted child, and therefore no early
cases determining whether an adopted child was of the class protected by
the rather modern anti-lapse statutes.
Where adoption is recognized in this country, at least in those juris-
dictions having the common law as the basis of their jurisprudence,8 it is
so recognized only by virtue of statute.4 Starting with a Massachusetts
statute in 1851,1 legislation in all jurisdictions now recognizes the institu-
tion of adoption and confers, in varying degrees, a right of inheritance on
the adopted child.6 These statutes have generally evolved so as to clothe
the adopted child with all the rights of a natural child relating to the in-
heritance of realty or the distribution of personalty from the adopting
parent.7 Generally, however, they have conferred no right on the adopted
child to inherit from the collateral or lineal kindred of the adopting
parent.8
3. Hockaday v. Lynn, 200 Mo. 456, 457, 98 S.W. 585, 586 (1906):
Adoption was . . . an incident of Spanish law, was incorporated into the Code
Napoleon, and from that code [or the Spanish law] found its way through Louisiana
and Texas ....
See also Vidal v. Commag~re, 13 La. Ann. 516 (1858).
4. See In re Estate of Levy, 141 So.2d 803 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962); In re Palmer's Adop-
tion, 129 Fla. 630, 176 So. 537 (1937); In re Howlett's Estate, 366 Pa. 293, 77 At. 2d
390 (1951); REPpY & TOMPKINS, LAW OF WILLS (1928); 1 Am. JuR., Adoption of Children
§ 3 (1936).
5. MASS. AcTs & RESOLVES, 185, c. 324 (1851).
6. ALA. CODE tit. 27, § 5 (Supp. 1963); ALASKA STAT. tit. 20, ch. 10, § 120 (Supp. 1965);
ARz. REV. STAT. Am. § 8-108 (Supp. 1965); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-109 (Supp. 1965);
CALIF. CIV. CODE ANN. § 228 (Derring 1965); CoLo. REV. STAT. § 4-1-11 (1963); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-65, 67 (Supp. 1964); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, §§ 919, 920 (Supp.
1964); D.C. CODE § 16-312(a) (Supp. 1965); FLA. STAT. § 72.22 (1963); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 74-414 (Supp. 1964); REV. LAWS HAwAII ch. 331, § 16 (Supp. 1961); IDAHO CODE § 16-
1508 (amended 1963); ILL. STAT. ANN. § 6-208 (Smith-Hurd 1964); IND. STAT. ANN. § 6-
208 (Burns 1965); IowA CODE ANN. § 600.6 (Supp. 1964); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2103 (1964);
Ky. REV. STAT. § 199.520 (Supp. 1960); L.S..-C.C. art. 214 (Supp. 1964); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. ch. 19, § 535 (Supp. 1965); MD. CODE ANN. art. 16, § 78; art. 93, § 147 (Supp. 1965);
MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 210, § 7 (Supp. 1964); MIcHr. LAWS § 710.9 (Supp. 1962);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.29 (Supp. 1964); Miss. CODE ANN. § 1269-06 (Supp. 1964); Mo.
STAT. Am. § 453.090 (Supp. 1957); Rav. CODE MONT. § 61-212 (amended 1965 LAWS OF
MONT. p. 197); REV. STAT. NEB. § 43-110 (Supp. 1963); NEV. REV. STAT. § 127.160 (1963);
N.H. REV. STAT. Am. ch. 461, § 6 (Supp. 1963); N.J. STAT. ANN. tit. 2A, ch. 22, § 3 (Supp.
1963); N.M. STAT. ANN. 22-2-10 (Supp. 1965); N.Y. CONSOL. LAWS ANN. D.R.L. § 117
(Supp. 1965); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-23 (Supp. 1963); N.D. REV. CODE § 14-11-13, 14 (Supp.
1957); OHIO REV. CODE § 3107.13 (1964); OKLA. STAT. ANNr. § 10-60.16 (Supp. 1964);
ORE. REV. STAT. § 109.050 (1953); PA. STAT. § 1-4 (Supp. 1964); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15.7.16
(Supp. 1964); S.C. STAT. AT LARGE No. 703 § 12 (1964); S.D. CODE § 14.0407 (Supp. 1960);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-126 (Supp. 1965); TEX. CirV. STAT. art. 46a § 9 (Supp. 1965);
UTAH CODE ANN. tit. 78, ch. 30. § 9 (Supp. 1965); VT. STAT. ANN. § 15-448 (Supp. 1965);
VA. CODE ANN. § 63-357 (Supp. 1964); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. tit. 26, ch. 32, § 140 (Supp.
1964); W.VA. CODE ANN. ch. 48, art. 4, § 5 (Supp. 1965); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 48.92 (1964);
WYo. STAT. § 1-721, 726 (Supp. 1965).
7. Supra note 6; REPPY & ToMPxINs, LAW OF WILLS (1928).
8. In re Estate of Levy, 141 So.2d 803 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962); Hockaday v. Lynn, 200
Mo. 456, 98 S.W. 585 (1906); In re Bradley's Estate, 185 Wis. 393, 201 N.W. 973 (1925);
1 Am. JUR., Adoption of Children § 63 (1936).
iContra, Brooks Bank & Trust Co. v. Rosabacher, 171 Atl. 655 (Conn. 1934); Kolb v.
Ruhl's Adm'r, 198 S.W.2d 326 (Ky. 1946); McFadden v. McNorton, 193 Va. 455, 69 S.E.2d
445 (1952).
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The fact that an adopted child is not considered capable of inheriting
from collateral or lineal kindred of his adopting parent does not, under
the general view, bar him from taking property devised or bequeathed to
his adopting parent under circumstances such as were presented by the
Baker case.' Such right has been held to be dependent not upon the laws
of succession or representation, which are properly applicable only to
questions of intestacy," but upon whether the child came within the scope
and meaning of the particular class designation used in the anti-lapse
statute." Thus, it has been held that an adopted child was an "issue," 2
"heir,' 3 "child,"' 4 "descendant,"' 5 and "lineal descendant"'" within the
meaning of such statutes.
In re Baker's Estate7 illustrates the position of the majority'l8 'and
is demonstrative of the rationale generally utilized. The court took two
steps in reaching its decision. First, it pointed out that Florida's anti-lapse
statute merely requires that the person taking by its operation be a lineal
descendant of the devisee or legatee; he need not be a lineal descendant
of the testator. Second, it explained that by the decree of adoption, the
9. In re Baker's Estate, 72 So.2d 268 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
10. In re Harmount's Estate, 336 II. App. 322, 83 N.E.2d 756 (1949); Warren v.
Prescott, 84 Me. 483, 24 AtI. 948 (1892).
11. E.g., In re Moore's Estate, 7 Cal. App. 2d 722, 47 P.2d 533 (1935) ; In re Buell's
Estate, 167 Ore. 295, 117 P.2d 832 (1941) ; Clark v. Clark, 76 N.H. 551, 85 AtI. 758 (1913).
12. Flynn v. Bredbeck, 147 Ohio St. 49, 68 N.E.2d 75 (1946); Industrial Trust Co. v.
Taylor, 69 R.I. 153, 32 A.2d 269 (1943). Contra, Arnold v. Helmer, 327 Mass. 722, 100
N.E.2d 886 (1951); Gammons v. Gammons, 212 Mass. 454, 99 N.E. 95 (1912); Phillips v.
McConica, 59 Ohio St. 1, 51 N.E. 445 (1898) ; In re Russell's Estate, 284 Pa. 164, 130 At.
319 (1925).
13. In re Harmount's Estate, 336 Ill. App. 322, 83 N.E.2d 756 (1949).
14. Dean v. Smith, 195 Ark. 614, 113 S.W.2d 485 (1938); Smallwood v. Smallwood,
121 N.J.E. 126, 186 At. 775 (1936); In re Walter's Estate, 270 N.Y. 201, 200 N.E. 786
(1936).
15. Clark v. Clark, 76 N.H. 551, 85 AtI. 758 (1913).
16. In re Tibbett's Estate, 48 Cal. App. 2d 177, 119 P.2d 368 (1941); In re Moore's
Estate, 7 Cal. App. 2d 722, 47 P.2d 533 (1935) ; Warren v. Prescott, 84 Me. 483, 24 Atl.
948 (1892); Soellinger v. Molzhan, 77 N.D. 108, 41 N.W.2d 217 (1950); In re Buell's
Estate, 167 Ore. 295, 117 P.2d 832 (1941). Contra, Rauch v. Metz, 212 S.W. 357 (Mo. 1919);
but see St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Hill, 336 Mo. 17, 76 S.W.2d 685 (1934).
17. Supra note 9.
18. Dean v. Smith, 195 Ark. 614, 113 S.W.2d 485 (1938) ; In re Tibbett's Estate, 48 Cal.
App. 2d 177, 119 P.2d 368 (1941); In re Moore's Estate, 7 Cal. App. 2d 722, 47 P.2d 533
(1935); In re Harmount's Estate, 336 Ill. App. 322, 83 N.E.2d 756 (1949); Warren v.
Prescott, 84 Me. 483, 24 AtI. 948 (1892); see also St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Hill, 336
Mo. 17, 75 S.W.2d 685 (1934); Clark v. Clark, 76 N.H. 551, 85 AtI. 758 (1913); In re
McEwan's Estate, 128 N.J.E. 140, 15 A.2d 340 (1940); Smallwood v. Smallwood, 121
N.J.E. 126, 186 Atl. 775 (1936); In re Carleton's Will, 3 Misc. 2d 677, 151 N.Y.S.2d 338
(Surr. Ct. 1956); In re Walter's Estate, 270 N.Y. 201, 200 N.E. 786 (1936) ; In re. Ramseyer's
Estate, 127 N.Y.S.2d 22 (Surr. Ct. 1953); In re Foster's Estate, 108 Misc. 604, 177 N.Y.
Supp. 827 (Surr. Ct. 1919); Headen v. Jackson, 225 N.C. 157, 120 S.E.2d 598 (1961);
Hoellinger v. Molzhon, 77 N.D. 108, 41 N.W.2d 217 (1950); Flynn v. Bredbeck, 147 Ohio
St. 49, 68 N.E.2d 75 (1946); In re Buell's Estate, 167 Ore. 295, 117 P.2d 832 (1941);
Industrial Trust Co. v. Taylor, 69 R.I. 153, 32 A.2d 269 (1943); Craft v. Blass, 8 Tenn.
App. 498 (1928). Contra, McLeod v. Andrews, 303 Ky. 46, 196 S.W.2d 473 (1946);
Arnold v. Helmer, 327 Mass. 722, 100 N.E.2d 886 (1951); Gammons v. Gammons, 212
Mass. 454, 99 N.E. 95 (1912) ; In re Russell's Estate, 284 Pa. 164, 130 Adt. 319 (1925).
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child is thereafter deemed to be the child and legal heir of the adopting
parent, entitled to all the rights and privileges of a natural child. There-
fore, the court concluded, to hold that an adopted child was not a "lineal
descendant," within the meaning of the anti-lapse statute, would be to
draw an arbitrary distinction between the adopted and natural child con-
trary to the legislature's expressed intention that no line should be drawn.
The court supported its statutory construction by the "doctrine of
substitution." Under this doctrine, the adopted child is deemed to take
directly under the testator's will by operation of the anti-lapse statute.19
The adopted child is not deemed to "inherit," because "inherit" means to
take as an heir at law, by descent and distribution, rather than under a
will.2"
To the extent that the Baker2' decision was based on a reading, in
pari materia, of Florida's anti-lapse22 and adoption2" statutes, the holding
was eminently correct. However, to the extent that Florida Statute, sec-
tion 731.3024 may have had any bearing on the decision, the writer takes
issue on two grounds. First, any utilization of section 731.3025 to establish
the right of the adopted child to take by operation of the anti-lapse statute
could only limit the clear import of the adoption statute:
By the decree of adoption the child shall be the child and legal
heir of the adopting parent or parents, entitled to all the rights
and privileges ... of a child born to such parent or parents in
lawful wedlock.26
19. In re Harmount's Estate, 336 Ill. App. 322, 326, 83 N.E.2d 756, 758 (1949): "... the
adopted children are taking by virtue of a statute which creates in them an original right
by virtue of their substitution for the legatee who predeceased the testatrix."
20. In re Harmount's Estate, 336 I1. App. 322, 83 N.E.2d 756 (1949); Warren v. Prescott,
84 Me. 483, 24 At. 948 (1892).
21. Supra note 9.
22. FLA. STAT. § 731.20 (1963) provides:
(1) If a devisee or legatee dies during the lifetime of the testator, the testamentry
disposition to such devisee or legatee lapses, unless an intention appears from
the will to substitute another in his place; but when any property is devised or
bequeathed to an adopted child or blood kindred of the testator, and such devisee
or legatee dies before the testator, leaving lineal descendants, or is dead at the time
the will is executed, leaving lineal descendants who survive the testator, such legacy
or devise does not lapse but such descendants take the property so given by will
in the same manner as the devisee or legatee would have done had he survived the
testator.
23. FLA. STAT. § 72.22 (1963) provides:
By the decree of adoption the child shall be the child and legal heir of the adopting
parent or parents, entitled to all the rights and privileges, and subject to all obliga-
tions, of a child born to such parent or parents in lawful wedlock ...
24. FLA. STAT. § 731.30 (1963) provides:
An adopted child, whether adopted under the laws of Florida or any other state
or country, shall be an heir at law and for the purpose of inheritance be regarded
as a lineal descendant of its adopting parents and the adopting parents shall
inherit from the adopted child. Such adopted child shall inherit the estate of its
blood parents, but such blood parents shall not inherit from such adopted child.
25. Supra note 24.
26. Supra note 23 (Emphasis added).
CASES NOTED
This clear and unequivocal statement of the rights of an adopted child
should not suffer by restrictive enumerations-which can only serve to
limit, never to expand, such a broad grant. Second, the court's utilization
of section 731.3027 in this manner is inconsistent with the court's own use
of the doctrine of substitution. The court pointed out the distinction be-
tween the right to inherit, by operation of the laws of descent and dis-
tribution and the right to take under a will. Taking by will is the effect
of the doctrine of substitution.28 Therefore, any utilization of section
.731.30,29 which defines adopted child as the lineal descendant of the
adopting parent for purposes of inheritance, to substantiate the adopted
child's right to take under the anti-lapse statute, is wholly incongruous
with the doctrine of substitution.
Aside from the foregoing comments, however, it is the writer's
opinion that the instant case is illustrative of a progressive outlook which
might well foreshadow legislation which will abolish any remaining legal
distinctions between an adopted and natural child.3"
WILLIAM J. KENDRICK
PUNITIVE DAMAGES ASSESSED AGAINST JOINT
TORTFEASORS-ADMISSBILITY OF WEALTH
The plaintiff received an award of compensatory and punitive
damages assessed jointly and severally against the defendants who were
joint tortfeasors. Upon consideration of the defendants' motion for a
new trial, the trial court held that it had erred in admitting evidence of
the financial worth of the individual defendants and ordered that unless
the plaintiff filed a remittitur in the amount assessed as punitive damages
within ten days, the motion for a new trial would be granted. The plaintiff
declined to remit the punitive damages and appealed. The First District
Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's order.' On certiorari to the
Florida Supreme Court, held, affirmed: evidence establishing the financial
worth of joint tortfeasors may be properly admitted in support of a prayer
for punitive damages. The court also adopted the use of a special or
27. Supra note 24.
28. Supra note 20.
29. Supra note 24.
30. For other cases illustrating such a progressive view, see generally McCune v. Oldham,
213 Iowa 1221, 240 N.W. 678 (1932) ; Denton v. Miller, 110 Kan. 292, 203 Pac. 693 (1922) ;
In re Sutton's Estate, 161 Minn. 426, 201 N.W. 925 (1925); Headen v. Jackson, 255 N.C.
157, 120 S.E.2d 598 (1961); McFadden v. McNorton, 193 Va. 455, 69 S.E.2d 445 (1952).
1. Spencer Ladd's Inc. v. Lehman, 167 So.2d 731 (Fla. Ist Dist. 1964). This
decision, rather than that of the supreme court, contains most of the substantive law.
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